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Cyberbullying and California’s Response
By ATTICUS N. WEGMAN*
I. Development of Cyberbullying Laws
CYBERBULLYING HAS BECOME an emerging issue, forcing its way
onto the doorsteps of schools and congressional floors. School admin-
istrators and public officials are grappling with difficult questions that
must be answered. Should California continue to rely on other, out-
dated statutes to address cyberbullying? Should California defer to the
federal government for criminalization? Should California criminalize
cyberbullying and hope the relevant criminal statutes are not constitu-
tionally struck down? Does cyberbullying warrant any reprimanding at
all?
With the advancement of technology-based communications—in-
cluding email, instant messaging, text messaging, chat rooms, conven-
tional websites, and social networking websites—bullying is moving
beyond the confines of the classrooms and cafeterias and into the
cyber realm.1 In fact, 43% of teens aged thirteen to seventeen report
that they have experienced some sort of cyberbullying in the past
year.2 Moreover, 81% of youth agree that bullying online is easier to
get away with than bullying in person.3
The term “cyberbullying” has been the subject of many defini-
tions. One organization defines cyberbullying as the “willful and re-
peated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones, and
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and Chapman University School of Law (J.D.). He currently focuses on general negligence
cases including government tort liability and products liability.
1. Kevin P. Brady & Kathleen Conn, Bullying Without Borders: The Rise of Cyberbullying
in America’s Schools, SCH. BUS. AFF., Oct. 2006, at 8, available at http://parentssee.wikispaces.
com/file/view/ASBO_Oct06_SBA_Article_Cyberbullying.pdf.
2. Chris Moessner, Cyberbullying, TRENDS AND TUDES (Harris Interactive, Rochester,
N.Y.), Apr. 2007.
3. COX COMMC’NS, TEEN ONLINE & WIRELESS SAFETY SURVEY: CYBERBULLYING, SEXT-
ING, AND PARENTAL CONTROLS 23 (2009), available at http://ww2.cox.com/wcm/en/
aboutus/datasheet/takecharge/2009-teen-survey.pdf?campcode=takecharge-research-
link_2009-teen-survey_0511.
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other electronic devices.”4 Another organization defines cyberbullying
as the “willful and repeated use of cell phones, computers, and other
electronic communication devices to harass and threaten others.”5
These definitions are a starting point for helping schools, states, and
the federal government understand, regulate, and in some cases
criminalize cyberbullying-type conduct.
Interestingly, states that have enacted some version of cyberbully-
ing legislation have mainly done so at the school level.6 In California,
voters have enacted various bullying statutes,7 particularly Assembly
Bill 86,8 which amended sections of the California Education Code
regarding pupil safety. One amended section was California Educa-
tion Code section 32261.9 Section 32261(d) holds:
It is the intent of the legislature . . . to encourage school districts,
county offices of education, [and] law enforcement agencies . . . to
develop and implement interagency strategies . . . that will improve
school attendance and reduce school crime and violence, includ-
ing . . . gang violence, hate crimes, bullying, including bullying
committed personally or by means of an electronic act . . . .”10
Section 32261(d) did not explicitly create any substantive crimi-
nal statute; it merely encouraged local authorities to address cyberbul-
lying concerns themselves.
Assembly Bill 86 also amended Education Code section 48900.11
Prior to section 48900’s amendment, existing law prohibited “the sus-
pension, or recommendation for expulsion, of a pupil from school
unless the principal determines that the pupil has committed any of
various specified acts, including, but not limited to, hazing.”12 There
4. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Fact Sheet: What You Need to
Know About Online Aggression, CYBERBULLYNG RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.cyberbullying.
us/cyberbullying_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis omitted).
5. Cyberbullying, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/de-
fault.aspx?tabid=12903 (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
6. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief Review of State
Cyberbullying Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.cyberbullying.
us/cyberbullying_state_laws.php (last updated Jan. 2012).
7. See, e.g., A.B. 1156, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (revising the existing defini-
tion of bullying, requiring training in the prevention of bullying, and authorizing a pupil
who has been a victim of bullying to transfer to another district); A.B. 9, 2007–2008 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2011) (same).
8. A.B. 86, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0051-0100/ab_86_bill_20080930_chaptered.pdf.
9. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32261 (West Supp. 2011).
10. Id.
11. 2008 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 646 (LEXIS).
12. Id.
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was no mention of bullying or cyberbullying.13 As amended, section
48900 gives school authorities the power to suspend or recommend
any student for expulsion who “engage[s] in an act of bullying,” which
includes “any severe or pervasive physical or verbal act or conduct,
including communications made . . . by means of an electronic act . . .
directed toward one or more pupils.”14
As such, California, like other states, has tried to address
cyberbullying at the school level. However, questions remain unan-
swered. For example, how are schools supposed to regulate cyberbul-
lying that occurs off campus?
Colleen Barnett, author of Cyberbullying: A New Frontier and a New
Standard: A Survey of and Proposed Changes to State Cyberbullying Statutes,
provides some insight to better address these unanswered questions.15
Barnett notes that there is considerable and persuasive scholarship
that maintains schools do not have the authority to curtail student
cyberbullying speech made off campus.16 Barnett concludes that par-
ents have the authority and that parental involvement is the first nec-
essary step.17 However, Barnett notes that there is still a problem
because “[y]oung people are sometimes reluctant to disclose victimi-
zation [to their parents] for fear of having their Internet and cellular
phone privileges revoked.”18 To help address this concern, Congress
attempted to enact cyberbullying legislation known as the Megan
Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act.19
Unlike the federal level, there does not seem to be any action in
California to enact or amend existing Penal Code statutes to provide a
criminal sanction solely for cyberbullying.20 One reason for this may
be that pupils, unlike adults, are fragile. The fragility of students war-
rants more coddling and less criminal sanctions than those found in
California’s existing stalking, false impersonation, hate crime, and
criminal threat statutes. Nancy Willard, Director of what was formerly
called the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use, observes that
13. See id.
14. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r); cf. A.B. 746, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011)
(amending section 33261 of the California Education Code to include the “posting of
messages on a social network Internet Web site” in the definition of an electronic act).
15. See Colleen Barnett, Cyberbullying: A New Frontier and a New Standard: A Survey of and
Proposed Changes to State Cyberbullying Statutes, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 579 (2009).
16. Id. at 587.
17. Id. at 588.
18. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Hinduja & Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyberbullying
Laws and Policies, supra note 6.
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brain research studies reveal teens have immature frontal lobe devel-
opment and therefore do not have the “hardwiring” necessary to con-
sistently make well-reasoned, appropriate decisions.21 This may help
explain why California addressed cyberbullying at the school level and
in the Education Code rather than the Penal Code. Given the unique
brain structure of children and adolescents, the traditional rationales
for punishment under the penal system might not warrant criminal
prosecution.
II. California’s Cyberbullying-Related Statutes
If adolescent victims of cyberbullying in California are finding
some redress through school legislation, what is being done to
criminalize such conduct? In California, relevant statutes include sec-
tions 653m(a) and (b),22 646.9,23 422,24 653.2,25 and 528.5 of the Pe-
nal Code.26
Section 653m(b) makes it a misdemeanor for any person who,
with the intent to annoy or harass, makes repeated calls by telephone
or other electronic communication device to another person.27 Be-
cause section 653m(b) requires repeated conduct, it would not
criminalize a single occurrence of harassing or annoying conduct.28
Moreover, without any published decision, it is difficult to determine
the scope of section 653m(b). Section 653m(a) makes it a misde-
meanor for anyone to contact another by phone or electronic means
using “any obscene language” or “any threat to inflict injury to the
person or property of the person . . . or any member of his or her
family.”29 Though there is no repeated contact requirement like sec-
tion 653m(b), section 653m(a) still requires either a threat or the use
of obscene language. A simple Facebook post calling someone “ugly”
or a “whore,” which would qualify as cyberbullying conduct, would not
suffice.
21. Nancy Willard, A Briefing for Educators: Online Social Networking Communities and
Youth Risk, CENTER FOR SAFE AND RESPONSIBLE INTERNET USE, http://www.techlearning.
com/techlearning/events/techforum06/MichelleRussell_ABriefingforEducatorsOnline
SociaNetworking.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m(a)–(b) (West 2010) (obscene, threatening, harassing,
or annoying telephone calls).
23. Id. § 646.9 (stalking).
24. Id. § 422 (criminal threats).
25. Id. § 653.2 (cyber-harassment).
26. Id. § 528.5 (e-personation).
27. Id. § 653m(b).
28. See Cal. Penal Code § 653m(b) (West 2010).
29. Id. § 653m(a).
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Section 646.9 requires a willful, malicious, and repeated following
or harassment of another, coupled with a credible threat with an in-
tent to place that person or their family in reasonable fear for their
safety.30 This statute requires that an actual threat of harm be made;
malicious teasing or bullying will not suffice.31
Section 653.2 makes it a misdemeanor for any person who—with
intent to place another person or their immediate family in reasona-
ble fear for their safety by means of an electronic communication de-
vice and for the purpose of imminently causing unwanted
harassment—electronically distributes, publishes, emails, hyperlinks,
or makes available for downloading personal identifying information, in-
cluding, but not limited to, a digital image of another person, or a
harassing message about another person, which would likely incite or
produce unlawful action.32 Section 653.2 is too narrow to cover all
cyberbullying-type conduct because it requires the dissemination of
personal identifying information and is really just a modification of
the existing California criminal stalking statute33 to prohibit “the type
of harassment that has become all to[o] commonplace in this digital
age, harassment committed using e-mail, cell phone, or some other
electronic communication device.”34 The purpose of section 653.2 is
to “simply [close] an electronic loophole in the stalking statute and
[give] law enforcement the ability to hold accountable those who
would prey on victims using electronic means.”35
Section 422 criminalizes threats made to another that are likely to
result in death or great bodily injury.36 Section 422 encompasses con-
duct directed at one specifically identified person.37 Moreover, it re-
quires an actual intent to commit a specific type of harm.38 This
statute does not address the situation of cyberbullying in which one
person might post disparaging comments about another on the In-
ternet but does not explicitly threaten to harm that person.39
Section 528.5 is a relatively new criminal statute and makes it a
crime to knowingly and without consent impersonate another
30. Id. § 646.9.
31. See id.
32. Id. § 653.2.
33. See id. § 646.9.
34. Jose Solorio, Bill Analysis, A.B. 919 (Cal. 2007), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.
gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0901-0950/ab_919_cfa_20070423_101211_asm_comm.html.
35. Id.
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2010).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
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through or on the Internet or other electronic means for purposes of
harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding.40 Section 528.5
was introduced by California State Senator Joseph Simitian who in-
tended to curb online impersonation by updating the existing false
impersonation law to accommodate modern technologies.41 Though
some believe this statute was introduced to criminalize cyberbully-
ing,42 there is no indication that this was the bill’s sole purpose.
Rather, legislative analysis focuses on the false impersonation of an-
other and not the direct tormenting or humiliation of another
through electronic means.43
Section 528.5 appears to criminalize some conduct that could
also be classified as cyberbullying that occurs through an impersona-
tion of another as long as the purpose of the impersonation was to
harm, intimidate, threaten, or defraud.44 What section 528.5 does not
cover, however, is teasing and joking that one person may post on
another’s Facebook page that does not involve impersonation.45
One commentator criticizes section 528.5’s language for being
susceptible to constitutional challenges under the overbreadth and
the vagueness doctrines for its use of the words “credibly impersonate”
and “harm another person.”46 Moreover, the Assembly Committee on
Judiciary admits that the existing law of false impersonation certainly
does not expressly exclude acts that might be performed through the
Internet.47 As such, the passage of 528.5 fails to directly address
cyberbullying, and as Ryan Calo, director of the Consumer Privacy
Project at Stanford Law School, notes, “the line between harmful in-
tent and satire [after the passage of section 528.5] remains blurred.
It’s difficult to point exactly to acts of impersonation that are threaten-
ing, intimidating or defrauding.”48
40. Id. § 528.5.
41. Tom Ammiano, Bill Analysis, S.B. 1411 (Cal. 2010), available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_cfa_20100621_101217_asm_
comm.html.
42. Andrea Koskey, New Year Brings New Law Targeting Cyberbullying, SF EXAMINER
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2010/12/new-year-brings-new-law-
targeting-cyberbullying.
43. Mike Feuer, Bill Analysis, S.B. 1411 (Cal. 2010), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.
gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_cfa_20100628_112759_asm_comm.html.
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2010).
45. Id.
46. Katharine Malone, Comment, Parody or Identity Theft: The High-Wire Act of Digital
Doppelgangers in California, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 275, 310–11 (2012).
47. Feuer, supra note 43.
48. Marrianne Levine, New Law Confronts Cyberbullying, STAN. DAILY (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://www.stanforddaily.com/2011/01/06/new-law-confronts-cyberbullying.
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Though there is no direct cyberbullying legislation on the books,
each of the above statutes can be used as starting points to help curb
some cyberbullying-type conduct. Unlike at least twelve other states,49
California does not have any statute that provides a criminal sanction
for cyberbullying.50
III. Cyberbullying and Cyberstalking at the Federal Level
The primary difference between cyberstalking and cyberbullying
is that cyberstalking takes place over a long period of time,51 whereas
cyberbullying can constitute one isolated incident.52 Moreover, most
cyberstalking statutes require proof of a credible threat of violence,
which might not be present in many instances of cyberbullying.53 At
the federal level, we can find laws regarding the criminalization of
cyberstalking conduct, but as of the date of this Article, there is cur-
rently no federal cyberbullying statute.54
In terms of cyberbullying statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is a useful
starting point. Section 875(c) makes it a federal crime, punishable by
up to five years in prison, for anyone that “transmits in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kid-
nap any person or any threat to injure the person of another.”55 The
statute applies to any communication actually transmitted in interstate
or foreign commerce, including threats transmitted via telephone, In-
ternet, or beepers.56 Given this expansive interpretation, section
875(c) appears to cover most cyberbullying activities. However, to trig-
ger punishment under the statute, there must be an actual threat to
injure another.57 Consequently, this statute would not apply to com-
mon cyberbullying activity that merely annoys or harasses another
over a period of time.58 Again, malicious teasing will not suffice.
49. Hinduja & Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyberbullying Laws
and Policies, supra note 6.
50. Id.
51. Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Cur-
rent State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 126 (2007).
52. Todd. D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 267 (2008).
53. Goodno, supra note 51, at 135–39.
54. See infra Part IV.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
56. See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1494 (6th Cir. 1997).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
58. ATT’Y GEN., 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND INDUSTRY (1999), available at http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Re-
744 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
Another cyberstalking related statute is 47 U.S.C. § 223. Section
223 makes it a federal crime, punishable by up to two years in prison,
to use a telephone or telecommunications device to annoy, abuse,
harass, or threaten another.59 This section requires that the perpetra-
tor conceal his or her name.60 It covers more conduct than section
875(c) and punishes less severe acts such as annoying and harassing
conduct—much like section 653m of the California Penal Code.61
However, it applies only to direct communication between a perpetra-
tor and a victim and would be inapplicable in a situation where a per-
son posts messages on a “public” bulletin board or in a chat room
encouraging others to “harass” or “annoy” another.62
In October 1998, President Clinton signed into law 18 U.S.C.
§ 2425 to protect children from online stalking.63 Section 2425 makes
it a federal crime to use any means of interstate or foreign commerce
to knowingly communicate with any person with intent to solicit or
entice a child into unlawful sexual activity.64 This statute appears to be
closely related to cyberbullying-type conduct; however, section 2425
does not include harassing phone calls to minors absent a showing of
a sexual purpose.65 Moreover, this statute appears to be designed for
curbing unlawful sexual conduct, not cyberbullying-type conduct.
This is a common issue with criminal law and the advent of social
networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook. There are laws that
protect people from cyberbullying-type conduct, but only if it also in-
volves sexual intent.66
Like California, federal legislation currently has no cyberbullying
statute, and consequently, there is still a gap between the cyberstalk-
ing and harassment related crimes and cyberbullying-type conduct.67
search%20-%20Digital%20Library/ClintonAdminHistoryProject/11-20/Box%2015/
1225098-justice-appendix-b-vol-2-3-4.pdf.pdf.
59. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006).
60. Id. § 223 (a)(1)(C).
61. See id. § 223.
62. ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34651, PROTECTION OF CHILDREN ON-
LINE: FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS ADDRESSING CYBERSTALKING, CYBERHARASSMENT, AND
CYBERBULLYING 8 (2008).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2425 (2006).
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 288.2, 288.3 (West 2008).
67. Alison Virginia King, Comment, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 857 (2010).
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IV. The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act
The push for cyberbullying laws at the federal level is largely at-
tributed to the 1999 Columbine High School shootings.68 The Colum-
bine High School shootings brought to light the most horrific side of
school bullying. Media accounts suggest that the perpetrators behind
the shootings had been victims of bullying themselves.69 After the Col-
umbine shootings, many researchers and school administrators began
to look more closely at bullying in schools and determined that bully-
ing is a serious problem.70
In 2006, the nation saw another horrific incident of bullying oc-
cur through the use of the Internet. Unlike the bullying at Columbine
High School, this case involved a young girl who took her own life
after being tormented through the social networking site, MySpace.71
Thirteen-year-old Megan Meier developed a relationship through
MySpace with another person whom she thought was a sixteen-year-
old boy named “Josh Evans.”72 In reality, Josh Evans never existed.73
Josh Evans was a fake name and profile created by the mother of a
student who attended school with Megan Meier.74 The student’s
mother, Lori Drew, continued to contact Megan in hopes of gaining
Megan’s trust and insight into Megan’s thoughts about her
daughter.75
Through the fake profile, Drew began sending hurtful messages
to Megan. For example, Drew stated, “I don’t know if I can be friends
with you anymore because I’ve heard you’re not very nice to your
friends”;76 “Megan Meier is a slut”; and “Megan Meier is fat.”77 Drew
took the messages even further and wrote, “You are a bad person and
68. See Brady & Conn, supra note 1.
69. Greg Toppo, Should Bullies Be Treated as Criminals?, USA TODAY, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-12/bullying-crime-schools-suicide/
55554112/1 (last updated June 13, 2012).
70. Kathleen Conn, Bullying in K-12 Public Schools: Searching for Solutions, COMMON-
WEALTH EDUCATION POLICY INSTITUTE, Winter 2006, available at http://www.cepi.vcu.edu/
pdf/Policy%20Briefs/Kathleen%20Conn-Bullying%20VCU%20PolicyPaper%202-11-06.
pdf.
71. Kim Zetter, Dead Teen’s Mother Testifies About Daughter’s Vulnerability in MySpace Sui-
cide Case—Update, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2008, 6:09 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2008/11/lori-drew-pla-1/.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen’s Suicide, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2007), http://
abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=3882520&page=1#.UY2KKisa-Kw.
75. Joshua Seth, Memorializing Megan Meier (Photos), EXAMINER.COM (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://www.examiner.com/article/memorializing-megan-meier.
76. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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everybody hates you. Have a sh@#$ rest of your life. The world would
be a better place without you.”78
Devastated by these remarks, Megan Meier committed suicide in
her bedroom closet on October 16, 2006.79 Megan’s parents felt un-
bearable pain; as Megan’s father explained, “That’s the biggest trag-
edy of the whole thing: An adult did it.”80 Importantly, Megan’s family
knew of Megan’s relationship with “Josh Evans” but was unable to stop
it.81 Megan’s mother even called the police to determine if they could
find out if “Josh Evans” was real.82 They could not.83 As the local
county’s spokesman stated, “what Mrs. Drew did ‘might’ve been rude,
it might’ve been immature, but it wasn’t illegal.’”84
After the death of Megan Meier, Lori Drew was arraigned in the
Central District courthouse in Los Angeles, California.85 Prosecutors
wanted to charge Drew with a crime, but there was no applicable fed-
eral statute against cyberbullying.86 As an alternative, the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office devised other novel arguments to prosecute Lori Drew,
one of which involved Lori Drew’s unauthorized use of MySpace.87
Prosecutors charged Drew with one count of conspiracy and three
counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), tra-
ditionally an anti-hacking statute.88 Because MySpace servers were
based in Los Angeles, personal jurisdiction was proper in California.89
Prosecutors alleged that Drew violated the MySpace user agreement,
which required users to provide factual information about themselves
and refrain from soliciting personal information from minors.90 By
acknowledging the contract’s terms with the click of a button and sub-
77. Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen’s Suicide, supra note 74 (internal quotations
omitted).
78. Seth, supra note 75 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
79. Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen’s Suicide, supra note 74.
80. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2007, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html.
85. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
86. Kim Zetter, Cyber Bullying Case Officially Dismissed for Vagueness, WIRED (Aug. 31,
2009, 1:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/lori-drew-ruling.
87. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
89. Zetter, supra note 86.
90. Id.
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sequently violating them, Drew committed the same crime as a
hacker.91
The jury acquitted Drew of all felony charges.92 However, the jury
found her guilty of “accessing a computer involved in interstate or
foreign communication without authorization . . . to obtain informa-
tion”—a misdemeanor.93 The jury did not find Drew guilty of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which would have made
Drew’s unauthorized use of a computer a felony.94 In a post-judgment
motion, Drew’s counsel, H. Dean Steward, argued that Drew’s viola-
tions of the MySpace terms of service (“TOS”) were not sufficient to
constitute a misdemeanor and that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague.95
Presiding Judge George H. Wu agreed with Steward. Judge Wu
reasoned that criminal statutes must contain a “fair warning” require-
ment.96 This mandates that criminal statutes comport with the vague-
ness doctrine, which invalidates a statute that either forbids or
requires performance of an act in such vague terms that men of com-
mon intelligence must guess at its meaning and, as a result, differ as to
its application.97
Judge Wu was also concerned with the intent requirement of the
CFAA. Judge Wu explained that the CFAA did not set forth clear
guidelines or objective criteria as to the prohibited conduct on the
Internet or other similar contexts.98 The Government argued that the
intent requirement was met by Drew’s conscious decision to violate
the MySpace TOS by using the website to harass Meier.99 Judge Wu
responded that if a conscious breach of the TOS is sufficient by itself
to satisfy the intent requirement, it would afford too much discretion
to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the In-
ternet.100 Thus, it seemed, the Government was stretching in their at-
tempts to find a sufficient enforcement mechanism to curb
cyberbullying.
91. Id.
92. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (2009).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 462 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
97. Id. at 463 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1977)).
98. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
99. Id. at 467.
100. Id.
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In terms of the CFAA’s application, Judge Wu noted, “While this
case has been characterized as a prosecution based upon purported
‘cyberbullying,’ there is nothing in the legislative history of the CFAA
which suggests that Congress ever envisioned such an application of
the statute.”101 Thus, once Drew was acquitted of the unauthorized
access of a computer to commit a crime or tortious act, the case
turned from an issue about cyberbullying to the applicability of the
CFAA in punishing violations of a website’s TOS.102
Steward believed everyone had a skewed version of the story.103
He commented that the victim’s mother worked with a public rela-
tions firm that demonized his client and further distorted the public’s
perception of the case.104 Steward continued to defend Drew, know-
ing from the outset of the case that the prosecution’s indictment for
violating the CFAA would fail on vagueness grounds.105 Steward lik-
ened cyberbullying to one person yelling at another across the street,
which alone, is certainly not a crime.106
Children cannot be completely prohibited from using the In-
ternet. With the fascination surrounding social networking sites, chil-
dren and teenagers are forced to use them or risk suffering backlash
from others. The use of social networking sites has become the social
norm and is not slowing down.107 Facebook recently surpassed MyS-
pace, which as of 2010 boasted over 206.9 million users.108 Today, chil-
dren, teenagers, and adults have the ability to post messages about
others or otherwise communicate without having to worry about the
possibility of instant physical confrontation.
After the acquittal of Lori Drew, Congress began looking into
ways to prosecute individuals for cyberbullying. The result was the
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, which was sponsored by
Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, a democrat from California.109 This
bill, which was introduced on April 2, 2009, failed to make much pro-
gress in Congress and was never brought to a vote in the House or
Senate. The bill would have amended the federal criminal code and
101. Id. at 451 n.2.
102. Id. at 451.
103. Interview with H. Dean Steward, Counsel for Lori Drew (Apr. 10, 2010).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Lance Whitney, Twitter, Facebook Use Up 82 Percent, CNET (Feb. 22, 2010), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10457480-93.html.
108. Facebook, Twitter Usage Surges, NEW STATESMAN (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.new-
statesman.com/digital/2010/02/facebook-hours-social-spent.
109. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009).
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imposed penalties on violators.110 The language of the bill sought to
punish anyone who “transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause
substantial emotional distress to a person, using electronic means to
support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior.”111 Unlike statutes
found in the California Education Code, a violation of the Megan
Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act would have provided for a felony
penalty.112
Megan Meier has not been the only victim of cyberbullying.
Others have committed suicide due to peer pressure channeled
through social networking sites.113 Enacting laws to protect people
from bullying through social networking sites could be the solution.
The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act would have been the
first of its kind to prosecute such conduct. The next question that
must be answered is whether laws regulating cyberbullying can with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.
V. Constitutional Concerns
The leading authority for student free speech is Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.114 In Tinker, three public
school students decided to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands.115 School officials became aware of the students’ plans and
adopted a policy whereby school officials would demand that students
remove their armbands.116 Students who refused to obey would be sus-
pended until they returned without the armband.117 On December
16, 1965, several students, against school policy, wore black armbands
and were subsequently suspended.118 The students then filed a com-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Cyberbullying and Other Online Safety Issues for Children: Hearing on H.R. 1966 and
H.R. 3630 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/
111th/111-76_52547.PDF.
113. See, e.g., John Halligan, Death by Cyber-Bully, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2005, at A13,
available at http://www.boston.com/yourlife/health/mental/articles/2005/08/17/death_
by_cyber_bully/; Brian Stelter, Web Suicide Viewed Live and Reaction Spur a Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/us/25suicides.
html ?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Web%20Suicide%20Viewed%20Live%20and%20Reaction%20Spur
%20a%20Debate&st=cse.
114. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
115. Id. at 504.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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plaint in federal court seeking an injunction to prevent school offi-
cials from issuing suspensions for wearing black armbands and
protesting the Vietnam War.119
The district court dismissed the students’ action, holding that
school authorities did not violate the Constitution and acted reasona-
bly to prevent disturbance of school discipline.120 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed without opinion.121 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and framed the issue as one not relating to the “reg-
ulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or
deportment. . . . Our problem involves direct, primary First Amend-
ment rights akin to ‘pure speech.’”122 The Supreme Court noted that
only five out of 18,000 students in the school system wore these arm-
bands and that the protest did not disrupt the school or classroom.123
Further, the Court noted that school authorities were not motivated
by fear of school disruption, but rather “the principle of the demon-
stration” itself.124
The Supreme Court developed two important rules when it de-
cided that the First Amendment protected the students’ speech of
wearing the armbands. First, citing an earlier Fifth Circuit case, the
Court held that prohibiting expression is not permissible unless it is
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with the
school’s work or discipline.125 Second, the Court explained that there
was no evidence of students’ interference with the school’s work or
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and let
alone.126 This second test has since been largely overlooked in the
progeny of student freedom of speech cases.127
In the 2010 case of J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District,128 a
federal district court ruled that school officials violated the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when they disciplined a student
who posted a video on YouTube that maligned a classmate.129 The
student’s video was a four minute and thirty-six second monologue
119. Id.
120. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 507–08.
123. Id. at 508.
124. Id. at 509 n.3 (internal quotations omitted).
125. Id. at 511 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
126. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
127. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1122.
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calling another student a “slut” and “spoiled.”130 The following day,
school officials demanded that the student who posted the video de-
lete it from YouTube and her home computer.131 The school then
suspended the student for two days.132 The student brought a lawsuit
alleging that the school violated her First Amendment constitutional
rights.133
The court applied the Tinker test and determined that the You-
Tube video did not create a risk of substantial disruption to school
activities, and as such, school officials violated the student’s First
Amendment rights.134 The court reasoned that the video was:
[N]ot violent or threatening. There was no reason for the School
to believe that [the subject’s] safety was in jeopardy or that any
student would try to harm [her] as a result of the video. . . . In-
stead, [the subject] felt embarrassed, her feelings were hurt, and
she temporarily did not want to go to class.135
The court in J.C. explained that it “cannot uphold school disci-
pline of student speech simply because young persons are unpredict-
able or immature, or because, in general, teenagers are emotionally
fragile and may often fight over hurtful comments.”136 The court’s
reasoning highlights an interesting perspective regarding the
criminalization of cyberbullying conduct. One commentator believes
there is a conundrum at issue here, at least in regards to criminalizing
cyberbullying conduct:137
This conundrum—that one student’s constitutionally protected
speech can be another student’s humiliation—lies at the heart of
the debate over how expansive the criminal regulation of bullying
should become. With each step toward greater protection of vic-
tims, the law risks further encroachment upon the free speech
rights of others.138
If the cases above did not find that students’ conduct created a
substantial disruption, what will constitute a substantial disruption?
One court has held that a substantial disruption requires something
130. Id. at 1098.
131. Id. at 1099.
132. Id.
133. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
134. Id. at 1122.
135. Id. at 1117.
136. Id. at 1122.
137. Tracy Tefertiller, Comment, Out of the Principal’s Office and Into the Courtroom: How
Should California Approach Criminal Remedies for School Bullying, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 168,
204 (2011).
138. Id.
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more than a “mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech,” but
it need not rise to the level of “complete chaos.”139 Though students
may discuss the speech at issue, this does not alone cause a substantial
disruption.140 In contrast, substantial disruption exists when a student
shows a teacher a poem that explicitly described a mass shooting of
his classmates and his own suicide;141 when a student creates a graphic
video-dramatization of his teacher’s death;142 or even when a student’s
article purports to tell everyone how to hack into school computers.143
The court in J.C. provided additional guidance as to what consti-
tutes a substantial disruption. The court explained that “[f]or the
Tinker test to have any reasonable limits, the word ‘substantial’ must
equate to something more than the ordinary personality conflicts
among middle school students that may leave one student feeling hurt
or insecure.”144
Nancy Willard argues that the judge in J.C. failed to address the
second prong set forth in Tinker.145 In fact, many cases post-Tinker
have failed to address Tinker’s second prong, which considers whether
a student’s speech imposed a substantial interference with the rights
of other students.146 Willard notes that though J.C. may appear to sug-
gest that school officials should intervene in cyberbullying situations
only if there is a substantial disruption of school activities, school dis-
tricts can rely on other case law to justify responding to situations
where one student is interfering with the security of another student,
regardless of the geographic origin of the speech.147 Willard cites Saxe
v. State College Area School District148 for support.149
139. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002).
140. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
141. Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2001).
142. O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL
4396895, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
143. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828–29 (7th Cir.
1998).
144. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1119 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
145. See Nancy Willard, There Is No Constitutional Right to Be a Cyberbully: Analysis of J.C. v.
Beverly Hills Unified School District, CENTER FOR SAFE AND RESPONSIBLE INTERNET USE (Dec.
16, 2009), http://www.embracecivility.org/wp-content/uploadsnew/2011/10/JCcyberbul-
lyingcase.pdf.
146. See Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment Provisions Revisited: No Bright-Line Rule, 2008
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 225, 240–43 (2008).
147. Willard, supra note 145, at 2.
148. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
149. Willard, supra note 145, at 1.
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Saxe dealt with a school district’s bullying prevention policy.150
Willard believes that although the court ultimately found the bullying
policy to be unconstitutionally overbroad,151 Judge Alito (now Su-
preme Court Justice) expressed concerns about the language of the
district’s policy—banning speech that “creat[es] an intimidating, hos-
tile or offensive environment”—because it did “not, on its face, re-
quire any threshold showing of severity or pervasiveness.”152 Willard
interprets the court’s reasoning to mean that school officials can regu-
late student speech that is sufficiently severe or pervasive, though not
merely “offensive,” if it substantially interferes with a student’s educa-
tional performance.153 It should be noted, however, that Saxe admit-
ted the precise scope of the second prong in Tinker was unclear,154
and it pointed to at least one court that opined the second Tinker
prong only covers independently tortious speech like libel, defama-
tion, slander, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.155
Willard also cites Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Educa-
tion.156 Willard notes that this case, like Saxe, involved student speech
that caused emotional harm to another student.157 However, in
Sypniewski, the issue was not “cyberbullying,” “bullying,” or even
“name-calling.” Sypniewski dealt with a school district’s anti-harassment
policy—in particular, racial harassment.158 The school had a history of
racial tension and enacted the policy in response.159 A student alleg-
edly violated the school’s policy when he wore a Jeff Foxworthy t-shirt
that displayed “redneck” jokes on the front and back.160 The school
suspended the student under the school’s dress code policy but noted
the student also violated the harassment policy.161 In deciding the is-
sue of free speech, the court did not find any “cyberbullying,” “bully-
ing,” or even “name-calling.”162 Rather, the focus of Sypniewski was on
150. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 202.
151. Willard, supra note 145, at 4.
152. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 202, 217.
153. Willard, supra note 145, at 4.
154. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217 (3d Cir. 2002).
155. Id. (citing Slotterbock v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp 280, 289 n.8 (E.D. Pa.
1991)).
156. Willard, supra note 145, at 1. See generally Synpiewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of
Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
157. Willard, supra note 145, at 4.
158. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 264.
159. Id. at 246.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 250–51.
162. Id.
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the anti-harassment policy itself.163 Sypniewski found the Jeff
Foxworthy t-shirt did not create a substantial disruption to warrant
infringing on the student’s First Amendment rights.164 The court also
found the school’s anti-harassment policy, with the exception of one
provision, was acceptable in light of the history of race relations at the
school, though the Jeff Foxworthy t-shirt did not violate that policy.165
Perhaps the best case to support Willard’s position is Kowalski v.
Berkeley County Schools.166 Kowalski involved the suspension of a student
for creating a website on which other students posted defamatory in-
formation about a classmate.167 The court in Kowalski found that the
school district did not violate the student’s free speech rights.168 In
doing so, Kowalski might have come the closest of any court to reviving
the second prong of the Tinker test. The court explained the speech
was “materially and substantially disruptive in that it ‘interfer[ed] . . .
with the schools’ work [and] colli[ded] with the rights of other stu-
dents to be secure and to be let alone.’”169 The notion that more
weight should be given to Tinker’s second prong has also been sup-
ported by legal scholarship.170 One argument for the revival of
Tinker’s second prong is that it will give school officials more power to
intervene to protect the safety and emotional well-being of innocent
victims from vicious, malicious cyber-attacks on their character and
reputation.171 However, as one commentator notes, Kowalski cited
Tinker’s second prong nine times throughout the opinion but failed to
incorporate its specific language in the conclusion of the opinion.172
Regardless if courts strengthen the limited authority found in Ko-
walski and other cases for the preservation of Tinker’s second prong to
protect victims of cyberbullying, there will still be an argument con-
cerning the seriousness of such conduct. Is cyberbullying or bullying
severe enough to warrant criminalization and punishment? This ques-
tion is difficult to answer and may be more apt for a philosophical
debate. Case law, on the other hand, need only deal with stare deci-
163. Synpiewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 269 (3d Cir. 2002).
164. Id. at 269.
165. Id. at 265–69.
166. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
167. Id. at 567.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 573–74 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969)).
170. See Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School Authority Over
Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 171, 203 (2012).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 202.
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sis.173 Unfortunately, as noted above, there does not seem to be much
case law in this area. Still, we are using the Tinker test—a case decided
over forty years ago. This is likely one reason why courts, legislators,
and school administrators are struggling to devise a proper way to
deal with the advent of cyberbullying.
VI. Off-Campus v. On-Campus Cyberbullying
School officials can punish cyberbullying occurring on-campus
with much less judicial scrutiny than off-campus cyberbullying. This is
because schools control when students are able to use computers, cell
phones, pagers, and the like on campus. A school can refuse to lend
its resources to student expression with which it disagrees as long as its
rationale is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns.”174 Schools also have the ability to set up their own computer or
cell phone policies.
Conversely, the majority of courts have found that off-campus In-
ternet speech cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of school discipli-
nary action.175 Moreover, schools are not vested with the power to
discipline students for conduct that relates solely to off-campus activi-
ties that are not school sponsored. To discipline students without run-
ning afoul the Constitution, schools must comply with the Tinker test.
Unfortunately, the Tinker test, as highlighted by its progeny, is a high
standard for schools to meet.176
This is not to say that off-campus cyberbullying speech can never
be regulated by schools under the First Amendment. Cyberbullying
speech that originates off-campus can be regulated if there is a “suffi-
cient nexus between the web site and the school campus.”177 This
nexus has been established in cases in which either a student accessed
a website at school during class or the website content was aimed spe-
cifically at the school and later carried on by students on campus.178 If
173. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (defining stare decisis as
“[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions
when the same points arise again in litigation”).
174. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988).
175. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
176. See Erb, supra note 52, at 267–68; Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp.
2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (holding when a student creates a website at home that dispar-
ages and insults his principal and results in “congregating and giggling” by other students
during school, it is not a substantial disruption because no classes were cancelled and no
widespread disorder occurred).
177. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002).
178. Id.
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courts do find a sufficient nexus between the speech and the school
campus, they will then examine whether the speech substantially or
materially disrupts the learning environment under the Tinker test.179
Thus, our current system under Tinker does allow schools to regu-
late cyberbullying conduct that occurs both on and off campus. Case
law has acknowledged that a special approach must be taken with re-
spect to the First Amendment and the public school setting whereby
school administrators must have the authority to “provide and facili-
tate and to maintain order.”180
VII.  Outside the Law
The law in the area of cyberbullying is young and unrefined. As a
result, it is important to recognize ways to deal with cyberbullying
outside the law.
Assuming there are no criminal statutes regulating such conduct,
the most powerful way to effectively combat cyberbullying is through
communication.181 Children must be taught to report cyberbullying;
young people need to know that adults will react quickly and respon-
sibly to instances of cyberbullying.182 Schools can also take the initia-
tive by educating parents and others within the local community
about the potential problems associated with cyberbullying.183 Finally,
school officials need to reevaluate their Internet use management pol-
icies and strategies to incorporate instances of student-to-student on-
line cruelty.184
Parents obviously play a large role in curbing the attitudes of our
youth. Some parents may even believe our American public school
system is more than an educational institution—it is also an institution
of reform. However, this is not the right tactic. If we are to hold
schools responsible for not only educating but also acting as the pri-
mary disciplinary figure in students’ lives, undoubtedly our students’
education will suffer. Schools cannot play the role of police officer in
the classroom.185 In so doing, schools will be forced to use valuable
resources for quasi-educational purposes rather than simply focusing
179. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969).
180. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 252–53 (3d Cir.
2002).
181. Brady & Conn, supra note 1, at 10.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging
Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 277 (2001).
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on education. Certainly, part of educating may require the teaching of
discipline. However, due to the muddled waters of cyberbullying law,
schools are not able to discern a bright-line rule regarding when, who,
and how they can discipline our students.
Conclusion
Cyberbullying has spread its tentacles into various areas of the
law. Courts are trying to understand how best to interpret cyberbully-
ing in congruence with the First Amendment. On the state level, the
legislature has begun providing our schools with more authority to
discipline students. On the federal level, Congress attempted to pass
cyberbullying legislation known as the Megan Meier Cyberbullying
Prevention Act. These tactics will prove helpful in increasing aware-
ness of the seriousness of bullying. However, the ongoing debate as to
what exactly constitutes bullying and whether bullying is serious and
pervasive enough to warrant its criminalization will remain.
Bullying has multiple definitions. Moreover, bullying is measured
on a continuum. For instance, on one end you will find teasing and
horseplay. On the other end, you will find true threats that rise to the
level of criminality. Somewhere in the middle is bullying-type conduct,
which is tough to identify and thus criminalize or discipline. The same
difficulties increase when the conduct is being transferred by secon-
dary means—such as by the Internet or cell phones—as opposed to
face-to-face contact. Mere awareness of bullying and its side effects
may be the best cyberbullying deterrent rather than re-evaluating the
Tinker test, enacting new laws that provide schools with more author-
ity, or limiting Internet usage.
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